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WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? by Abraham Drassinower,  
Harvard University Press, 2015, 288 pp., Hardcover, $39.95 
 
Reviewed by Mark Rose 
English Department, University of California, Santa Barbara 
mrose@english.ucsb.edu  
 
Some years ago I published a book, AUTHORS AND OWNERS, in which I told 
the story of the divorce of copyright from censorship and its reconception as 
property.  I described how in the course of an eighteenth-century legal and 
commercial struggle in Britain the author was established as a property owner, the 
originator and proprietor of an intangible object, the literary work.  The author 
and the work – like the twin suns of a binary star locked in orbit, I suggested, 
these two concepts define the center of the modern copyright system.  It is 
precisely this system that Abraham Drassinower seeks to dismantle in WHAT’S 
WRONG WITH COPYING?, a philosophical study in which he attempts to 
extract from the tensions and ambiguities in copyright doctrine a coherent 
conceptual structure.  In place of copyright as a property right, Drassinower 
proposes a system based on the notion of authorship as speech.  Whereas 
traditional copyright concerns the relationship between the author and the work, a 
person and a notional thing, Drassinower proposes a view centered on the 
relationship between multiple speakers, between members of a community 
engaged in conversation. 
 
Drassinower’s conceptual starting point is the doctrine of independent creation.  
Two works may be identical – as in Borges’ wonderful story PIERRE MENARD: 
THE AUTHOR OF THE QUIXOTE – and yet, if independently created, each is 
accepted as an original work.  This means that a work is an action not a thing.  
Other key doctrines for Drassinower are the creativity or skill and judgment 
requirement, the idea/expression dichotomy, fair use, and what he calls “non-use” 
– that is, when only a material rather than a communicative use is involved as in 
the classic case of Baker v. Selden1 concerning accounting forms.  From these 
principles and from close analyses of key cases, including Nichols v. Universal,2 
Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone,3 and CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of 
Upper Canada,4 Drassinower constructs a theory based on the concept of writing 
as an act of communication.  The author thus becomes a speaker among other 
speakers rather than the originator of a commodity.  The work becomes a 
discourse.  Moreover, since expression is always social – expression towards 
The IP Law Book Review                 2 
 
another – the author’s discourse must also be conceived as an invitation to 
dialogue.  An author is a speaker speaking to other potential speakers, all of 
whom have, in principle, equal rights.  Drassinower’s approach thus has affinities 
with Kant’s conception of a book as a speech to the public, a conception shared, I 
might note, by Milton in the Areopagitica. But Drassinower’s book is not a mere 
gloss on Kant so much as an exposition of the way the principles of such a 
dynamic and socially oriented approach are already implicit in Anglo-American 
copyright. 
 
“I think these matters are not to be decided by accountants based on percentages.”  
So said Judge Pierre N. Leval in connection with Salinger v. Random House, the 
classic case in which J.D. Salinger sued to prevent the use of quotations from his 
unpublished letters.5  From the reduction of law to utilitarian economic analysis to 
the glorification of the scientific disciplines and the decline of literary and other 
interpretive studies in our universities, we are in a moment in which 
quantification increasingly dominates our culture.  Indeed, even within literary 
and historical studies, the last few decades have seen the emergence of 
quantitative analyses.  I am thinking, among other things, of the use of 
computerized stylistics to determine authorship and of computerized mapping of 
correspondents as, for example, between cultural centers in Enlightenment 
Europe.  One of the great appeals of Drassinower’s study is that it provides a 
humanistic theory of copyright, one that puts personhood and expression rather 
than quantification at the heart of copyright theory.  It seeks to rescue copyright 
from the accountants. 
 
The conventional justification of Anglo-American copyright is incentive theory.  
From this point of view, copyright exists to provide incentives for the 
“encouragement of learning,” as both the Statute of Anne and the U.S. Act of 
1790 put it.   That is, copyright provides the author with a limited property right 
as a spur to cultural production.  But, as Drassinower shows, the instrumentalist 
paradigm does not account for such fundamental copyright distinctions as that 
between an unprotectable telephone directory and a protectable poem.  Moreover, 
the incentive paradigm – like the property-based discourse that underwrites it – 
inevitably leads to quantification.  Most obviously, the notion that more is better, 
that more cultural production is in itself a good, is an invitation to calculation.  
More subtly, the notion that copyright doctrine seeks to find a balance between 
authors’ and users’ rights, between private property and public purposes, is also 
an invitation to calculation.  Which weighs more, the property or the public 
purpose?  The notion of “balance,” Drassinower explains, is an inappropriate 
metaphor because a balance or scale cannot make distinctions between different 
kinds of values. 
 
Both copyright minimalists and copyright maximalists assume the instrumentalist 
conception of copyright.  Thus their disputes about the relative advantages of high 
and low copyright protection – which will produce the greater benefit? – amount, 
in Drassinower’s trope, merely to skirmishes on a shared terrain.  Divorced from 
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normative standards, from grounding in the concept of personhood and speech, 
Drassinower suggests, nothing but sterile calculations of efficiency can function 
as a limiting standard on the endlessly expansive claims of copyright.  According 
to Drassinower’s view, a genuine interrogation of copyright would look less like a 
“largely empirical debate about the requirements of progress” and more like a 
discussion of, among other things, the “meaning of authorship” and “the meaning 
of progress” (152).  As it is, however, copyright discourse is, as he puts it, 
“drowned in oceans of social science evidence” (153). 
 
As the humanist imperatives of his discourse suggest, Drassinower has a finely 
developed sense of language and metaphor.  Indeed, at the heart of his study is a 
specifically metaphorical agenda, the attempt to transform the fundamental trope 
in which copyright is framed from property to speech, from commodity to 
communication.  Speech implies response.  All speakers are in principle equally 
empowered to participate in the conversation.  This account offers equality in 
place of efficiency and dialogue in place of balance as, in Drassinower’s phrase, 
“metaphors structuring copyright interpretation” (120).   The conventional notion 
is that the utilitarian or instrumentalist account of copyright provides better for the 
public domain than a rights-based account.  Drassinower challenges this 
assumption, arguing that instrumentalism can offer only an impoverished vision 
of the public domain as absence or loss – the name for that which, in the cause of 
the public interest, is decreed beyond protection.  But Drassinower’s rights-based 
account – copyright as the right of all speakers – offers an affirmative view: the 
public domain as a matter of intrinsic worth, a nonnegotiable, constitutive aspect 
of copyright law.  Interestingly, the term that Drassinower actually uses here is 
“dignity” not “worth” – he speaks of the “inherent dignity” (157) of the public 
domain – perhaps precisely because of the commercial and economic overtones 
implicit in “worth.” 
 
WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? Drassinower’s title asks, and he illustrates 
his question with a wonderful picture of a quizzically staring parrot, head askew.  
The meaning of the title gradually becomes clear as the book progresses.  What’s 
wrong is the whole discourse that placing copying at the heart of the matter 
entails.  Grounding the account of copyright in speech rather than property entails 
a dislocation of copying as the organizing principle of copyright doctrine.  
Copyright, then, “is not an exclusive right of reproduction but an exclusive right 
of publication” (225).  This dislocation resolves some of the tensions in present 
doctrine.  The current status of translation, for example, is incoherent.  As a 
derivative right, a translation must be authorized, but at the same time a 
translation generates its own copyright.  But translation, as Drassinower 
repositions it, is not properly authorship and thus should not attract an 
independent right.  The “dignity of translation,” he explains, “is of a different 
order than that of authorship” (223).   Indeed, grounding the account of copyright 
in speech rather than property requires the elimination of the whole concept of the 
derivative work.  “Derivative authorship” is, Drassinower remarks, an 
“oxymoron” (223). 
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I note that in denying translation the “dignity” of authorship and generalizing to 
reject the concept of any kind of derivative authorship Drassinower is in effect 
revisiting and deconstructing the historical process through which the concept of 
derivative works emerged, starting with the establishment of the translation right.  
In the United States the pivotal case was Stowe v. Thomas6 in which Harriet 
Beecher Stowe failed to prevent an unauthorized German translation of UNCLE 
TOM’S CABIN.  Justice Robert C. Grier’s 1853 decision declared that Stowe’s 
copyright was limited to the literal text of her novel in English.  Invoking William 
Blackstone’s classical description of the nature of the protected work –“the same 
conceptions, cloathed in the same words”7 – Grier declared that the identity of an 
author’s novel does not consist in the characters, ideas, or information “but only 
in the concrete form which he has given them, and the language in which he has 
clothed them.”8  Anyone then would have the right to translate Stowe’s novel into 
whatever other language they pleased. 
 
The hinge on which Blackstone’s classic formulation turned was the common 
eighteenth-century metaphor of the dress of language, an ancient trope going back 
to the Roman rhetorician Quintilian.  But metaphors are potentially fluid and 
unstable.  In 1847, shortly before Stowe brought suit, the American treatise writer 
George Ticknor Curtis had proposed that “the mere act of giving to a literary 
composition the new dress of another language” did not create a new work.9  The 
body under the dress remained the same.  Thus Curtis in effect flipped 
Blackstone’s metaphor, insisting that it was the “body” of the work rather than the 
“dress” that copyright protected.  Stowe had invoked Curtis unsuccessfully in her 
pleadings, but ultimately Curtis’s transformation of Blackstone’s metaphor 
prevailed.  In 1870 Congress in effect overturned Grier’s decision by explicitly 
granting authors the right to translations of their works.  And in 1879, Eaton S. 
Drone, the author of the principal American copyright treatise of the later 
nineteenth century, aggressively defended the principle that the author retains the 
translation right.  The translator creates nothing, Drone argued.  “He takes the 
entire creation of another, and simply clothes it in a new dress.”10  Once the 
protected work was no longer understood as “the same conceptions clothed in the 
same words” but as some kind of underlying “body” or “creation” the way was 
clear to establish that other kinds of derivative rights such as movies adapted from 
plays would also be protected. 
 
Observing the way that Drassinower’s argument leads to the elimination of the 
translation right and the related concept of the derivative work points, I think, to 
the complex and, as I will suggest, sometimes uneasy relationship between his 
theoretical project and the historical material on which it draws.  At the same time 
it confirms the importance of Drassinower’s alertness to language and metaphor.  
As the evolution and inversion of Blackstone’s metaphor instances, the metaphors 
in which we think sometimes take on a life of their own as agents in the historical 
process.11 
 
The IP Law Book Review                 5 
 
As I have noted, Drassinower’s agenda can be understood as the attempt to 
transform the fundamental trope in which copyright is framed from property to 
speech.  Key to this is the proposition that creativity – or some equivalent concept 
– rather than labor grounds copyright.  But the explicit articulation of creativity 
theory in the law is relatively recent.  Feist v. Rural Telephone was decided in 
1991.  This is not, I think, a significant difficulty.  Drassinower’s project – unlike 
my own in AUTHORS AND OWNERS – is not to provide an historical narrative 
of copyright’s development, but rather to offer a philosophical analysis that 
resolves tensions and inconsistencies.   Whereas I, pursuing my historical 
narrative, might be satisfied with – might indeed rejoice in – the identification of 
gaps and contradictions in the historical process, Drassinower’s quite different 
project seeks to resolve such perplexities into a self-consistent theoretical account. 
 
At the same time, however, Drassinower reaches back into the period of 
copyright’s formation to find an historical anticipation of his theoretical account 
in the classic debate between Lord Mansfield and Sir Joseph Yates in Millar v. 
Taylor in 1769.  Lord Mansfield was the defender of the author’s common-law 
right whereas Yates denied that writing, being immaterial, could be a property.  
Although Yates accepted that the Statute of Anne could provide the author with a 
limited statutory protection, the only property right he acknowledged was the 
author’s right to his physical manuscript.  Lord Mansfield, as Drassinower notes, 
countered Yates by remarking that he was talking about the author’s “copy” rather 
than his manuscript, specifying that he used “copy” in the technical sense in 
which that term had been used for ages to signify an incorporeal right to the sole 
printing and publishing of a discourse.  What Mansfield was in truth invoking, 
Drassinower argues, was a right to an action not a thing.  Thus Mansfield might 
be seen as anticipating Drassinower’s own twenty-first century founding of 
copyright in action rather than in property, even as the eighteenth-century struggle 
resulted in the establishment of copyright under the rubric of property.   This is 
not the way we usually think of Mansfield, the proponent of common-law 
copyright and perpetuity.  The historical irony, Drassinower reports, is that 
“grasping Mansfield as having posited copyright as property” is grasping him 
from Joseph Yates’ point of view not his own (178). 
 
I don’t think I have ever before understood Mansfield’s position in quite this way, 
but I accept – at least in a general way – Drassinower’s representation, as I 
gratefully accept his generous comments about my own work.  Drassinower talks 
about writing as an invitation to dialogue and the relationship between his new 
book and my old one perfectly illustrates his point.  But at the same time I note 
that there remains an ambiguity, a duplicity, about the old term “copy”  that 
should not be lost.  “Copy” was indeed used to refer to a right rather than a thing, 
but at the same time it seems to have retained – and indeed continued to retain, at 
least into the 20th century – a sense of the physical manuscript prepared for the 
press.  Think of newsroom “copy paper” and of “copy boys” running “copy” from 
reporters to editors.   Moreover, even as he remarked that he used the term “copy”  
in the technical sense, Mansfield insisted – as the booksellers had done – that the 
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copy was a form of incorporeal property.  It was of course Blackstone, arguing in 
Tonson v. Collins in 176212 and later developing his argument in the second 
volume of his COMMENTARIES in 1766, who fully transformed discourse into 
property in formulating the notion of copyright protecting specific sentiments 
“clothed”  in specific words and thereby defining “identity” of a literary 
composition.  Was Mansfield in 1769 thinking along lines that truly anticipate 
Drassinower’s argument or was he, already influenced by Blackstone, allowing 
the booksellers’ notion of “copy”  to acquire solidity and the aspect of a thing 
rather than an action?  It is of course impossible to say. 
 
My point is not that Drassinower is “wrong” in his citation of Mansfield.  I don’t 
think he is.  In fact, I found his reading of Mansfield one of the most exciting and 
provocative moments in his book and I would not have him excise it.  But nor do I 
think the citation of Mansfield is really essential to his argument.  History and 
philosophy have different agendas.  History – a narrative of struggles, 
contentions, and ambiguities – provides, I think, too slippery a foundation for the 
erection of an elegant intellectual edifice such as Drassinower is constructing.  
Drassinower’s enterprise is not to tell stories but to rationalize and formalize the 
residue of history, to reconstruct from its contradictions a coherent and more 
humane account of copyright.  That I believe he has done and done brilliantly. 
 
ENDNOTES 
A version of this review also appears in Jurisprudence: An International Journal 
of Legal and Political Thought. 
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Harvard University Press, 2015, 288 pp., Hardcover, $39.95 
 
Reviewed by Jessica Silbey 
Northeastern University School of Law 
j.silbey@neu.edu  
 
There are several radical aspects of Abraham Drassinower’s book WHAT’S 
WRONG WITH COPYING? One is that he shoves to the side the question of 
copyright incentives and the economic theory of intellectual property law, both 
long-standing starting points for copyright theory and doctrine.  Drassinower 
makes no intellectual apologies for this sidelining and justifies it by the second 
radical aspect of his book: he claims to be exploring copyright law on its own 
terms, not on terms from outside copyright (economics or behavioral incentives) 
but from internal to copyright law as written and developed since the Statute of 
Anne.1  This he does in impressive fashion, as I will briefly describe below.  It is 
refreshing and a welcome intellectual and aesthetic exercise to work so closely 
with phrases and arguments of famous copyright cases, as if with one’s hands and 
a pile of clay.  As a reader one comes to a new understanding and appreciation for 
what the cases say and how they can be freshly understood as a way forward in 
our “copyright wars” debating an increasing copyright scope and a shrinking 
public domain.2  As Drassinower says in his introduction, he sets out to 
“demonstrate that the assumption that copying is wrongful is a radically mistaken 
way to approach copyright law.”3  And he writes on the first page of the Preface 
that “[t]he point is to retrieve from within copyright law a neglected appreciation 
of the copiousness of copying, not as the agitations of wealth-maximization, but 
as the reverberations of thinking as a shared activity.”4  So while this book 
engages the on-going debate over the proper scope of copyright – a debate critical 
for democracy, dignity and peace (could there be any more significant triad?) – 
the terms of Drassinower’s engagement are original and therefore deeply 
welcome. 
There is at least a third radical aspect of Drassinower’s book connected to the two 
already mentioned. Drassinower resets the debate about how copyright law should 
work and how it explains itself on its own terms by starting with basic concepts 
mobilized throughout copyright doctrine and recasting them anew.  The book 
begins and ends with “copying” and “the copy,” so from the start we have a sense 
of first principles being righted.  But in addition to these cornerstone terms, 
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Drassinower fully debunks the empty placeholder of “value” in Chapter 1 (“The 
Poverty of Value”) by showing how foundational concepts like “originality” and 
“works of authorship” as protected categories within copyright law cannot be 
derived from the notion of “value” or “balance,” which are ubiquitous terms in the 
economic analysis of copyright.  He pursues similar ends by revising our 
understanding of “originality” in Chapter 2, “work” in Chapter 3, “infringement” 
and “speech” in Chapter 4, the “public domain” in Chapter 5 and “rights” in 
Chapter 6.  The book is a thorough and persistent reconceptualization of copyright 
on its most basic terms. 
For example, in Chapter 1, Drassinower razes the fundamental theoretical concept 
of “value” and posits a new center to copyright law.  He begins by saying: “The 
basic problem with the model [of construing works … as instances of economic 
value] is that not any and all value sounds as a matter of copyright law. … 
Originality guards the entrance, so to speak, into copyright territory.  [And yet] 
[i]t grants copyright to some but not all instances of economic value.”5  After a 
close, patient reading of four principal cases about originality and its relationship 
to labor, skill and judgment in copyright law6, Drassinower concludes the chapter 
this way: 
Framed as a balance, copyright law becomes nothing more than a 
distributive mechanism, on the one hand designed to achieve a balance 
between authors and users, yet on the other unable to make the qualitative 
distinctions necessary to get the entire balancing process going in the first 
place.  In the absence of a principled fulcrum, copyright law is more the 
field of a struggle for value, and even a source of contested weapons in 
that struggle, than a juridical practice elucidating the conditions for the 
possibility of its resolution. … 
[The idea of balancing values] enlists for this task not only the concepts of 
creativity and skill and judgment, but also the entire arsenal of copyright 
doctrines that separates out different kinds of values and reserves 
protection for only some of them.  Thus, for example, the idea/expression 
dichotomy refuses protection to ideas, regardless of their value, and 
regardless also of the creativity or skill and judgment, if any, that their 
production may have involved.  Similarly, fair use or fair dealing represent 
a refusal to grant protection for the use of copyright subject matter in 
respect of certain purposes.  These are decision to retain the definition of 
the author as a value-originator, yet to curtail in light of the public interest 
the value-amount to which the author is entitled. They are decisions to 
distribute values toward users rather than authors.  
The basic difficulty with this option is that it does not have at its disposal 
the tools necessary to make the distinctions it requires.  It cannot account 
for the doctrinal operations it deploys precisely because, as distinction 
between kinds of value, those operations irretrievably presuppose concepts 
other than value itself.7  
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What replaces “value” as the measure by which we decide the proper distribution 
of use rights?  He says: 
The alternative option is to accept the unambiguous affirmation of 
creativity and skill and judgment as an invitation to elaborate the 
specificity of authorship.  To follow this option is to pursue relentlessly 
the logic implicit in the transition from sweat of the brow to creativity and 
skill and judgment, and thus to take on the task of setting forth copyright 
doctrine in general and originality in particular not as a mechanism 
designed to distribute the value of a work but as an elucidation of its 
distinctive nature.  It is only in this way, I think, that we can hope to grasp 
copyright subject matter not as an instance of unspecified value but – to 
use the language of copyright law – as the work of an author.8  
At the center of Drassinower’s explanation of copyright law, therefore, is not 
value or balance but a person and her expression.  More on this in a moment. 
In Chapter 2, Drassinower performs a similar transmutation of underlying 
copyright concepts with “originality.”  He elucidates the term in light of critical 
and longstanding copyright doctrines of “independent creation” (a defense to 
copyright infringement in the case of substantial similarity), the idea/expression 
dichotomy (a limit to the subject matter of copyright), and fair use (an example of 
the lawfulness of unauthorized copying of an author’s work). At once intuitive 
and hard to specify, the content of “originality” in copyright law has long been 
debated as a basic justifying principle as well as a limitation of scope.  
Drassinower clarifies this all-important concept as rooted in human social values, 
offering “speech, equality and dialogue in place of value, efficiency and balance 
as signposts to guide copyright interpretation.”9  In doing so, Drassinower reveals 
an underlying preference – a deontological referent as a central feature of his 
analysis of copyright which he mentioned in his introduction.  
In the beginning of the book, Drassinower wagers there exists such an idea of “the 
inherent dignity of authorship” that “animates” copyright doctrine.10  He mentions 
it again when he previews that “the principle of independent creation … 
recognizes, as an equality matter, acts of authorship per se” and that fair use 
“affirms and confirms the equal authorship of each and all.”11 In Chapter 2, 
Drassinower returns to this theme of equal dignity when explaining the doctrine 
of independent creation as a feature of originality, copyright’s starting point.  He 
writes that it is  
“[n]ot the content of an author’s speech, but the very speaking itself [that] 
is at issue in copyright law. … If an author has a right to her original 
expression, then so must everyone else, including the defendant in any 
given copyright action. … As soon as the law of copyright grants an 
author rights in her expression the law of copyright also requires that the 
author submit to every other person’s equal right in his original 
expression. ... As much as the plaintiff’s originality, the defendant’s 
defense is rooted through and through in independent creation. Each 
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speaks in her own words. … At stake is not an external limitation of the 
plaintiff’s claim but rather the principle holding plaintiff and defendant 
together as parties to a legal action centered on the authorship of each and 
both.  Independent creation shows us unequivocally that copyright law 
engages the author not as a self-contained atom but rather as an author 
among authors.”12   
Drassinower builds similar arguments around the “bilateral recognition of the 
parties’ equal claims as authors” to derive the idea/expression dichotomy and fair 
use. 
Chapter 3 continues this theme explaining through an analysis of Baker v. Selden 
how the reproduction right is limited to the recommunication of a work as a work, 
that is, a repetition of the author’s speech and not as a tool or a “nonuse” in 
copyright terms.13  “Written in 1879, Baker v. Selden remains the most far-
reaching reflection available on the relationship between copyright law and digital 
technology.”14 (Drassinower considers other cases as well, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba 
Soft and Canadian Ass’n of Internet Providers v. Society of Composers, Authors 
and Music Publishers of Canada.) Central to the distinction between mere copies 
and an infringement is the reproduction of a plaintiff’s work as a 
recommunication of her speech. Recommunication – what Drassinower 
intriguingly calls “compelled speech” – would be an infringement whereas a 
reproduction that is a “reasonably necessary aspect of the defendant’s own 
authorial engagement” or of the “work in its material form” as a “tool” or “thing” 
is not.15   
We hear in this and other explanations of fundamental copyright doctrine the 
centrality of personhood in copyright law defined in terms of equal dignity and 
autonomy.  It is here I want to focus the rest of my comments because 
Drassinower leaves this point to be assumed as an acceptable and uncontestable 
orientation for his philosophical and hermeneutic examination of copyright law.  
To be clear, I do not disagree with this as a fundamental baseline for copyright 
law or other legal regimes.  I seek only to elaborate upon it in hopes of gesturing 
toward even more fruitful considerations of “equality” and “autonomy” in 
copyright debates yet to come.  And this brings me, first, to the parrot on his book 
cover. 
I presume Drassinower put the parrot on his book cover because parrots copy and 
his book embraces copying as a good and necessary act, not a wrongful one.  But 
underlying much of this book’s argument is the force of personhood, and parrots 
are not people nor are they people-like.  From the standpoint of equality – which 
is a standpoint Drassinower insists upon – parrots are like foxes (or other 
animals).  In Pierson v. Post, another case Drassinower artfully rereads and relies 
upon to illuminate the centrality of personhood in a discussions around property, 
he describes the fox as silent and necessarily so in order for the case to be about 
first possession of things as between people.  Drassinower cleverly reimagines 
Pierson v. Post with a second fox that sneaks in at the last moment to kill the first 
fox and carry it away.  
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“[I]t does not occur to us … to ask whether Post could sustain a cause of 
action against Fox 2 in respect of Fox 1. … On the contrary, if 
immediately after Fox 2 intrudes on the scene to bite Fox 1, Post smiles 
gleefully and ensnares either or both foxes, it is clear that Post has indeed 
constituted a property right to either or both foxes. … The silence of the 
fox, then, signifies its exclusion from the community of entities whose 
voice is recognized as a voice that counts, whose acts are worthy of 
respect.  When the fox screams because a hunter mortally wounds it, we 
do not ask it to tell us its story. … But when a hunter screams because 
another hunter snaps up a prey about to be captured, then we find 
ourselves before a very difficult question about the origins of ownership 
and we in fact ask both hunters to tell us their stories.  The point is simply 
that persons, not animals, have standing as owners, as entitle capable of 
claiming entitlements through their acts, as beings whose stories get a 
hearing.  An entirely different set of concerns would have arisen, for 
example, had Pierson ensnared and killed Post rather than the fox.”16 
Drassinower’s exegesis of Pierson v. Post continues in a remarkable manner, 
tying it to and illuminating his asserted copyright foundations.  
“If a distinction between persons and things is at the heart of the case, as 
indeed it is, then the case must be resolved in a manner that respects that 
distinction.  Neither of the parties can be treated as a mere fox.  Neither of 
the parties can be silenced – or treated as if it were nothing more than a 
means to the satisfaction of the other party’s desire.  That is what the fox 
is and that is why it is dead:  silent or silenced. … We bother about the fox 
not because we care about the fox per se, but because the parties or 
persons involved have something to say about the fox. The fox has no 
independent status or meaning here.  Only the parties do.  And because 
each and both of them do, we cannot resolve the dispute by denying either 
of them that status.  We must arrive at the decision of who is legitimately 
entitled to the fox in a manner that is respectful not only of the winner’s, 
but also of the loser’s, status as a person.  That is, we must decide the 
conflict between persons by being respectful of the principle of personality 
that, according to the case’s own presuppositions, each of them equally 
embodies.”17  
Equality is everywhere in Drassinower’s book, and so I cannot resist equating the 
fox and the parrot.  We may wonder if a distinction exists between the two 
animals that matters for Drassinower’s explanation of copyright law to justify the 
parrot’s prominence on the book cover.  Of course, Drassinower insists that the 
“parroting” (my term, not his) of speech is not wrong as long as the speech is in 
one’s own words.  Is therefore the parrot on the cover speaking its own words 
(likely impossible)?  Or, more likely, does it resemble the fox, a puppet or tool 
lawfully dominated by a person, which domination is a sign of privilege 
recognized by the law as a form of ownership?  If speaking one’s own words 
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signifies copyright authorship, which is a form of autonomy recognized as equal 
dignity in Drassinower’s analysis, then a parrot is not an author.  
On the other hand, when parrots copy human speech, they are not taking our 
words (they are not “speaking our words without authorization” a form of 
compelled speech that Drassinower defines as infringement).  Parrots copy to be 
in dialogue.  Copying is what parrots do as a matter of social behavior, to relate to 
and recognize what is going on around them, in particular who is speaking and 
how.  So although like the fox, parrots as animals are to Drassinower’s analysis 
irrelevant from the perspective of the juridical logic of copyright as a regulation 
of speech between people with equal dignity, parrots “dialogue through copying” 
– often verbatim copying – and this may be key to the parrot’s cameo on the 
cover.  A dog (or a fox) on the cover would make no sense.  We may talk to our 
pet dogs all the time, but dogs do not talk back.  And although most canine pet 
owners would confirm that our pet dogs recognize us as persons to be respected 
and are finely attuned to the goings on around the house and neighborhood, a 
dog’s failure to copy our speech gives us a sense of their dumbness.  We don’t 
think of dogs as smart like parrots. A parrot’s copying is a sign of their 
intelligence, at least that is the story we tell. And that seems another justification 
for the parrot on his book cover.  
This is not to say that Drassinower claims one must be intelligent (as in smart or 
quick-witted) to be a copyright author.  But he does appear to say that intelligence 
as in the character of the human mind and intelligibility as a matter of language 
and representation is critical to copyright authorship.  Parrots don’t have the 
human mind part, but they are intelligible in the second sense.  What they lack, 
however, is equality, as is painfully made clear by the foxes’ demise.  Parrots (or 
foxes) are not equal to people.  And equality, it seems to me from reading this 
book, is critical to the argument about copyright as a “bilateral recognition of the 
parties’ equal claims as authors.”  So what does Drassinower mean by human 
equality after all?  
In the literature on the philosophy and politics of equality, it usually takes one of 
three dimensions, each contestable in its own right but each nonetheless 
normatively and practically meaningful as applied throughout legal disputes.  One 
concept is comparative and formal in nature, as in “likes being treated alike,” or 
formal neutrality.18  This is a basic non-discrimination principle.  It suffers, as one 
can realize almost immediately when trying to apply it in practice, from an empty 
center.19  What characteristics count for assessing similarity?  If we’re different 
on the basis of race but similar on the basis of test scores, does that mean we 
should be treated the same or that different treatment is not an equality problem 
for the purpose of doling out benefits on the basis of scores not race?  
Alternatively, if an office provides a female employee who nurses her newborn 
baby keys to a private room in which to pump breast milk but does not give a 
similar benefit to another employee who wants privacy for making phone calls, 
are we treating them “unequal” or is the accommodation for a nursing mother the 
recognition of a different kind of equality – the equality of access and 
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opportunity?  Failure to accommodate the nursing mother may be seen as a 
denigration of the choice to nurse and it may – in the aggregate and over time – 
subjugate her to lost opportunities and less benefits as a woman should she 
therefore stay home while nursing.  Failure to accommodate her choice to be a 
nursing mother at work becomes a form of dominance, leaving her unequal and 
less free.  Accommodation – treating people differently in order to equalize 
opportunity – is a different kind of equal treatment that recognizes the harm of 
subordination and dominance in applications of formal neutrality.20 
Anti-subordination equality is offended when treatment or denial of access is 
correctly interpreted as a form of denigration.  For example, one may deny 
nursing opportunities to mothers because of a belief they should be home with 
their children (we disagree with their choice to work outside the home), or 
because of a belief that mothers make bad workers (we think men are better 
employees than women).  Both judgments are experienced as subjugations, 
constraints on free will by virtue of a judgment about the lesser quality of a 
person.  As compared to an anti-discrimination equality principle – formal 
equality – this anti-dominance equality relies on identifying forms of subjugation 
that are usually less than mortal wounds (see the fox) and more like coercion or 
duress (like compelled speech).  For his analysis of copyright law, Drassinower 
engages this kind of anti-dominance equality that rejects the presumption of 
hierarchies (e.g., authors over users) as well as situations that would perpetrate or 
perpetuate hierarchies (e.g., broad derivative work rights or narrow fair use).  
Properly construed, copyright doctrine based on the equal dignity of authors 
cannot be understood to subjugate one person to another if they are speaking their 
own words and are to have the right of response (what Drassinower describes in 
terms of fair use or fair dealing as use of another’s words that is “reasonably 
necessary for the allowable purpose.”21   
But Drassinower also relies on what appears to be yet a related third approach to 
equality philosophy, and that is the assurance of independent entitlements or 
freedoms to “develop capabilities.”22  This kind of substantive equality rests on 
the notion that each person is entitled to certain basic needs to facilitate her 
agency as worker, parent, or intelligent agent in the world.  It requires not a 
formal equality – everyone gets the same – but a contextual equality.  We assess a 
claim of wrongful deprivation of this equality not in relation to the possessions or 
opportunities of another person (a nursing room or admission to a school) but 
according to a substantive standard of living as a person.  This is an account of 
rights that people have as people (not parrots) and denying these rights is a denial 
of human dignity – or as Drassinower might say of “autonomy” – that each person 
may claim on the same basis as any other, that is, equally.23 
Drassinower’s “equal dignity” approach to copyright, which as I suggest includes 
both an anti-dominance and a capabilities understanding of equality, deserves a 
fuller exposition in his analysis.  Although to be fair, it appears to be an assumed 
baseline for the book and not the subject of the book itself.  He explains, for 
example, that equal dignity at the core of copyright requires the absence of 
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subordination of one copyright author to another.  But, as one recognizes quickly, 
being enjoined from speaking another’s words even if you are engaging them as 
an author is a form of control, just not an unlawful form (according to 
Drassinower). Why?  Because he says this control is actually (or should be) 
manifested as self-restraint and mutual deference to authorship as such.  As he 
says in the very beginning “your authorship is not a prerogative to control mine, 
as if you could treat my agency as a mere appendage subordinate to yours.”24  
Whether restraint appears as noncopying or as a form of tolerance of another’s 
speech (or both) is unclear.  Why mutual restraint respecting one another’s 
authorship is not an unlawful form of dominance or control that would otherwise 
be a denial of equal dignity seems circular unless it rests on an even more basic 
principle than equal respect of another’s choice when, whether and how to speak.  
Drassinower writes, for example, that “[c]opyright infringement is ventriloquism 
practiced on an unwilling subject, … a wrong to [an]other, whose mouth is being 
moved … behind her back,”25 which sounds as form of dominance and 
submission, whereas engagement through personal use or fair dealing is not 
harmful in the juridical copyright order he derives because it “fulfills the destiny 
of a work.”26  These are evocative images that elaborate the conversation, and yet 
they require more explication if the order Drassinower claims to establish is to 
make the best sense.  
A key to Drassinower’s argument is the public domain, a point that could use 
even more emphasis at the beginning of his book as it eventually, toward the end, 
refocuses the conversation from persons (individuals) to people (society).  This is 
a tricky analytical move in any legal or political philosophy because of the 
discomfort with aggregating individual preferences to reach a consensus on what 
is good for peace and prosperity over all.  But Drassinower makes it well by the 
end of the book when he says forcefully: “equality … anchors the public 
domain.”27  And so finally the important question arises as to how to conceive of 
equality as an individual right (of authors or otherwise) as well as a social good 
that structures the public or body politic.  Conceiving of the public domain as 
essential to a capabilities approach to social welfare (which includes copyright 
protection) may help.  Whether or not Drassinower is thinking in these terms, he 
devotes much of Chapter 5 to the “necessary, integral and irreducible status of the 
public domain” as the fountain from which copyright welfare for all authors 
springs.28  And Drassinower’s account of copyright “defines and confines the 
scope of an author’s copyright in light of her place in the ongoing conversation of 
which she is but a participant,”29 the conversation (or “dialogue”) being public 
not private.  (The title of the chapter is “Public Domain as Dialogue.”)  
“Dialogue” undersells the point, although it ably amplifies the bilaterality and 
equality norms structuring the rights at issue.  What Drassinower seems to mean 
he says later at the end of this chapter and then again at the end of the book: 
Copyright law arises not as a distributive balance of intangible 
commodities but as a juridical order addressing aspects of the interaction 
between speaking beings … The public domain thus emerges far more 
forcefully, not as a depository of value for which no payment is extracted, 
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but as a radically nonnegotiable set of conditions for dialogue flowing 
from the very nature of copyright subject matter as communication.”30  
… 
In the balance model [of copyright], a work of authorship is a fenced-in or 
propertized intangible. … Copyright subject matter is thus imagined as a 
self-contained entity, a thing, limits to which come from its outside, so to 
speak, as challenges to its producer’s otherwise despotic dominion. … In 
the dialogue model, by contrast, an author’s right to exclude others from 
his choice to speak or not speak is instead, and necessarily, a mode of 
inclusion.  Speech contemplates audiences and interlocutors.  It has with 
itself, by its very nature as address, the principles of its own self-
limitation.  To posit the inherent dignity of authorship is simultaneously to 
posit the public domain.  In the world of copyright, an author is no 
sovereign despot in an inverted world of commodities.  She is rather a 
citizen among others in the great Republic of Letters.31  
And thus the public domain in copyright is nothing short of the sustainable 
conditions on which we all rely to communicate and assert ourselves in our 
society that promises equal dignity to all.  
Drassinower suggests that instead of efficiency and value as the public goods 
copyright seeks to achieve, equality and autonomy (the equal dignity of authors) 
structure the juridical order of copyright doctrine.  If, as he writes, “balance” is a 
form of “war,”32 then “equal dignity” is a form of “peace.”  As mentioned above, 
equality does not mean equipoise, but a quality of person, a citizen, who may 
demand to be read or heard in a certain way.  This equality of citizenship (which 
necessarily comes with positive rights) is actually quite revolutionary.  (We 
usually demand freedom from interference by the state or others not the freedom 
to engage or use or possess with the help or forbearance from government or 
others).  It is revolutionary in the context of welfare rights (food, housing, 
healthcare, education) and so it is with copyright.  Drassinower dips into this 
revolution by, among other things, declaring the derivative work right inconsistent 
with copyright’s own basic structure.  He explains that “derivative authorship” 
imposes a hierarchy of authors, which, if authors are equal citizens, is intolerable.  
He also does so by immunizing the “personal use” (copying for the purpose of 
enjoying the work).33  These are highly contested issues in copyright law today, 
especially in our digital age when both derivative works and personal uses are 
inevitable and everywhere, and Drassinower boldly deals with both. 
Although he does not say it explicitly, Drassinower implies that we express 
ourselves, whether through speaking, writing or some other communicable 
medium, in order to be in the world and to insist on our recognition.  Copyright 
law must be understood to equally facilitate this most basic human feature.  This 
too is revolutionary as a matter of intellectual property law.  Only relatively 
recently do intellectual property scholars resemble human rights advocates; the 
overlap remains a nascent and promising field for further study and concern.34  
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Whether or not Drassinower would accept this description of his work, WHAT’S 
WRONG WITH COPYING? is a book about human rights inasmuch as it is about 
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The book, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING?1, has two objectives.  The first 
objective is to show that the dominant economic approach to delineating 
copyright’s scope and limitations is fundamentally flawed.  The second is to derive 
from copyright doctrine directly a more persuasive and effective alternative to 
understanding and ultimately defining copyright’s scope and limitations.  
Unfortunately, the book fails to achieve either. 
The book presents three principal critiques of the dominant economic approach to 
copyright.  The book’s first critique of the economic approach is that copyright 
does not extend or deny its protection to any given creative effort based upon the 
value the effort generates.2  Rather, it focuses on the nature of the creative effort, 
and asks whether the creative effort at issue represents authorship.  We cannot, 
therefore, understand copyright generally, or copyright doctrines, such as 
originality, specifically, as an attempt to maximize value, or so Drassinower 
contends.  This critique is a strawman.   
As Drassinower himself recognizes, in economics, we distinguish between public 
and private goods not based upon the value they create, but on the presence or 
absence of rivalrous consumption.3  An economics or instrumental approach is not 
thus limited to differentiating things based upon value.  In intellectual property, we 
distinguish between copyrightable works of authorship and patentable inventions.  
We distinguish them not based upon the value they create, but based upon whether 
the creative activity at issue results in a work of authorship or an invention.  These 
legal categories are not, however, deontological constructs, but in my view, reflect 
underlying instrumental concerns.  I would argue (and indeed, have argued) that 
we separate creative activities into patent and copyright because the cost 
investment and cost recovery structures associated with these two creative 
activities differ.4  Because the cost structures differ, we need differing legal 
regimes, with differing prerequisites and differing scopes of protection to identify 
when a market failure is likely, and to remedy it without imposing undue social 
cost.  For example, the requirement that an invention be nonobvious before it is 
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entitled to a patent makes sense given the cost investment and recovery structure 
for the sorts of creative activities we protect through patent.  There is no need for 
patent to protect original and novel inventions that are also routine, trivial, or 
obvious.  Given the intrinsic difficulties associated with copying the sorts of things 
that we protect as patentable inventions, the ordinary workings of the market will 
tend to ensure the efficient development of routine or obvious advances.5  
Extending patent protection to such obvious advances would impose social costs, 
without any return benefit.  In contrast, the originality standard better defines when 
market failure becomes likely, in the absence of some special protection, for the 
sorts of creative efforts we protect as copyrightable works of authorship.  Consider 
the counterfactual: If we required nonobviousness for a movie to receive 
protection, only a handful of movies over the last twenty years would likely 
qualify.  More importantly, the vast majority of movies, including virtually all 
romantic comedies, would not satisfy the standard and would therefore be left 
unprotected.  Without protection, it is at least plausible that many of these movies 
would not be forthcoming.  Originality is not therefore a deontological principle in 
copyright, but an instrumental one.  Originality best defines, for the sorts of 
creative efforts we protect as authorship, when market failure becomes likely.  
Similarly, the differences between patent and copyright’s respective scopes of 
protection also reflect instrumental concerns.  For example, patent protects against 
independent creation of the same invention, but copyright does not.  This 
difference does not reflect some deontological difference in the intrinsic nature of 
patent and copyright, but real-world instrumental concerns.  Specifically, near-
simultaneous independent creation of competing inventions is more likely than 
near-simultaneous independent creation of competing works of authorship.  For 
example, assume that three companies are racing to develop cures for three 
diseases.  They are all using similar methodologies and similar information, yet 
one company will win the race in each case, coming in a month or two ahead of 
the others.  If the patent infringement standard were “copy,” rather than “make, 
use, or sell,” then the winning company would have at most a month or two to 
recoup its research expenses before the others entered the market and near-perfect 
competition began.6  Under such an infringement standard, none of the companies 
would recover their research investment.  Foreseeing that result, none would make 
the investment.  A copying standard would not therefore solve the market failure 
problem for the sorts of creative activities we protect as patentable inventions.  In 
contrast, the “copying” standard works reasonably well to resolve the market 
failure for the sorts of creative activities that we protect as works of authorship.  
Independent creation of identical movies, for example, seldom occurs, and even 
where two movies happen to explore the same topic at the same time, the movies 
invariably differ sufficiently that competition between them will not drive prices to 
marginal cost.  Thus, the presence of A BUG’S LIFE or DEEP IMPACT did not 
reduce the ticket price for seeing ANTZ or ARMAGEDDON.   
The fact that we cannot differentiate between authorship and works of authorship, 
on the one hand, and a variety of non-authorship creative products, including 
patentable inventions, on the other, based upon value is simply irrelevant.  We 
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provide different prerequisites and scope of protection for inventions (through 
patent) and works of authorship (through copyright) because the cost investment 
and recovery structure for these two types of creative endeavors differ.  Because of 
the differing cost structure, different prerequisites identify when a relevant market 
failure is likely, and different scopes of protection remedy the relevant market 
failure at the least social cost. 
The second critique the book offers is to point out that the empirical balancing of 
costs and benefits an economic approach requires can be indeterminate, given the 
data available.  In Drassinower’s view, this occasional indeterminancy renders the 
economic approach unhelpful.7  While true in some cases, this sort of 
indeterminancy is not a problem unique to the economic approach.  Any approach 
that we might use for drawing a line between, for example, protected expression 
and unprotected idea will have the same problem.  Whatever approach we use, 
there will be cases where the line can plausibly be drawn on either side.  
Indeterminancy is not therefore a problem unique to the economic approach.  
Furthermore, even if this critique somehow cut more deeply as applied to an 
economic approach, better data and proper application of the burden of proof 
would seem the proper response, rather than abandonment of the economic 
approach altogether.  More importantly, even if there are hard cases under an 
economic approach, there will also be easy ones – cases, such as Google Books, 
where the expected welfare gains from finding fair use far exceed any plausible 
estimate of the welfare losses.8  We should not get so caught up in the search for a 
perfect line-drawing tool that we miss the obvious:  The economic approach does a 
better job than any conceivable alternative both in identifying the salient 
characteristics of an easy case and in identifying the right outcome.         
The book’s third critique of the economic approach, and perhaps the most 
interesting, is to suggest that by embracing the economic approach, proponents of 
narrower copyright (or “copyright minimalists”) have allowed the proponents of 
broader copyright (or “copyright maximalists”) to set the terms of the debate and 
have thereby already lost.9  As support for this critique, Drassinower points out 
that over the last two hundred years the economic or instrumental approach has 
been the dominant paradigm in Anglo-American copyright jurisprudence and over 
that same time period, copyright protection, both in scope and duration, has 
steadily expanded.10  The weaknesses in this argument are, however, readily 
apparent.  As Drassinower himself admits, this historical correlation does not 
establish causation.11  We have, after all, seen the same expansion in copyright 
protection in France and Germany, where non-instrumental, rights-based 
perspectives hold sway.  Indeed, some of the expansion in United States copyright 
protection has come about due to efforts to harmonize our consequentialist 
copyright laws with those of deontological Europe.  Nor should we discount the 
substantial, if sometimes hidden, role rights-based accounts play within United 
States copyright law itself. 
In addition, for much of its history, the direct costs of copyright have been largely 
hidden, if not altogether lost, in the more general welfare losses associated with the 
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natural monopoly cost structure and the resulting oligopolistic market structure of 
the copyright industries.  Given the technology and market structure in 1950, it did 
not matter whether the copyright on a book lasted five years, fifty years, or five 
hundred years.  For virtually all books, there would be an initial print run, after 
which the book went out of print.  Given the technology and market structure at 
the time, there was essentially no chance that another publisher would pick up the 
book and reintroduce it, whether the book was under copyright or not.  The 
repeated extension of copyright’s term through 1998 did not therefore reflect a 
failure of the consequentialist approach, but an accurate assessment that the costs 
of longer copyright, given the technology and market structure at the time, were 
essentially zero.  True, the benefits were also essentially zero, and personally, I 
would have preferred Congress to strike a different balance.  But at the time, given 
the technology and market structure, neither the costs nor the benefits of a longer 
copyright term were particularly compelling.  That Congress chose one result, 
rather than the other, in these historical debates is not therefore a meaningful 
indictment of the consequentialist approach.   
Copyright has always been driven by changes in the cost of creating and 
distributing works of authorship.  In the analog era, just as we could offer a 
reasonable instrumental justification for a longer copyright term, we could also 
offer a reasonable instrumental justification for a broad derivative or reproduction 
right.  With analog technology, costs and market structure often meant that only 
one film version of a novel would be created.  Given that, there was little reason 
not to require that one film version to be authorized.  Only one license would need 
to be negotiated; so transaction costs would be small.  Moreover, given the 
distribution market for films at the time, requiring a license imposed no 
deadweight losses.  Whether a film was an authorized or unauthorized derivative 
work, the admission price at the theater remained the same.  At this time, a broad 
derivative or reproduction right made reasonable instrumental sense.   
Digitization and the Internet have fundamentally changed the cost of, and the 
associated market for, the creation and distribution of works of authorship today.  
With the technology available today, works that have been out of print for years 
could be, but for unduly long copyright, reintroduced into the market.12  Rather 
than a narrow trail of derivative works, any given novel today might spawn 
thousands of competing, overlapping derivative works.  Requiring licenses for all 
these uses becomes impracticable, and the deadweight losses if we insist on 
licensing become substantial.  Just as the introduction of the printing press changed 
the cost of creating and distributing works of authorship in a way that justified the 
initial creation of copyright, so too today, changes in the cost of creating and 
distributing works of authorship due to the digital revolution have changed the 
cost-benefit calculus of copyright.  It is this changed calculus that makes today’s 
copyright both unduly long and overly broad.  Consequentialist or instrumental 
reasoning can justify both copyright’s initial creation and today’s current need to 
cut it back; a deontological or rights-based approach cannot.13         
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Rather than concede the field to the copyright maximalists, the consequential 
approach is beginning to push back and to push back strongly.  True, we are just at 
the beginning.  Progress in narrowing copyright is painfully slow.  Progress is slow 
not because instrumentalism is the wrong tool, but because judges are people, and 
people fear change and cling to the familiar (and copyright owners do not want to 
give up what they perceive as theirs).  As a result, as we move forward to a happier 
world of narrower copyright, there is likely to be some backsliding.  Already, 
however, the knee-jerk tendency to expand copyright to encompass new uses, 
which might have been appropriate in the analog era, is starting to fade.  The 
defeat of SOPA and PIPA in Congress, and the expanding scope of fair use in the 
courts over the last fifteen years perhaps best illustrate this slow progress.   
As a consequentialist proponent of minimalist or narrow copyright, I am strongly 
encouraged by what I have seen over the last fifteen years.  We are just now 
beginning to gather the sorts of empirical evidence that we need to understand the 
role copyright plays in the creative process, as well as the costs it imposes.  We are 
just now moving beyond the casual assumptions and bedtime stories that have 
dominated the discussion and helped to drive copyright’s expansion over the last 
two hundred years.  We are just now beginning to win the battle for a limited 
copyright that actually promotes “the progress of Science.”  Rather than celebrate 
with me these initial signs of success, Drassinower asks me instead to abandon the 
consequentialist approach on the cusp of victory.   
Now, if he could offer guaranteed victory through his alternative, I might be 
tempted.  But he cannot.  All he can offer is an unpersuasive principle derived 
from a flawed methodology.  As his methodology, Drassinower examines some of 
copyright’s key cases and doctrines in an attempt to discern the underlying 
copyright principles that animate copyright law.   
As applied to case law, this methodology is intrinsically flawed.  In the natural 
sciences, we can make observations of, for example, objects falling and derive 
from our observations a hypothesis, and eventually, a theory of gravitational 
attraction.  This methodology works in the natural sciences because each 
observation is driven by the same underlying natural law.  There is no 
corresponding natural law of copyright.  Most obviously, copyright, unlike gravity, 
is historically contingent.  If Drassinower applied his methodology to 16th century 
copyright (no protection), to 18th century copyright (short, limited protection), or to 
20th century copyright (long, broad protection), he would derive very different 
underlying principles.  Indeed, even within the 20th century, applying his 
methodology to United States copyright law before the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Feist Publications (sweat-of-the-brow justifies copyright) and after the decision 
(sweat-of-the-brow does not justify copyright) would paint quite different pictures 
of copyright.  Stare decisis or statutory language may limit the discretion of 
individual judges in particular cases, but at the end of the day, judicial decisions 
remain ad hoc resolutions of the particular disputes that parties, for their own 
idiosyncratic reasons, choose to bring, and the arguments the parties choose to  
make.      
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Holding up a mirror to judicial opinions in an attempt to see the underlying 
principles that bind them is futile.  There is no there there.  All that Drassinower 
can see in such a mirror is an imperfect reflection of himself.  He is not 
discovering the hidden principles of copyright through his methodology, but only 
the values, preconceptions, ideologies, and biases that he brings to the search.  This 
is most evident in his selection of a small subset of copyright cases, focusing on 
Feist Publications, and the corresponding copyright doctrine of originality as the 
basis for his methodology.  Had he started with some other case, such as Campbell 
v. Acuff-Rose Music, or some other doctrine, such as Congress’s decision to 
extend copyright protection to computer programs, his methodology would have 
led to a vastly different perspective on copyright’s fundamental principles.        
Even if we put to one side the deeply flawed methodology, however, the principle 
Drassinower derives – that copyright exists to prevent forced or compelled speech 
– is equally problematic.  Most obviously, it is not literally accurate.  I am familiar 
with instances of what I would consider compelled speech.  It is compelled speech 
when a prisoner of war is tortured until he makes a video renouncing his home 
country.  It is compelled speech when, before the Fifth Amendment prohibition on 
self-incrimination, a criminal defendant could be forced to either admit guilt or 
perjure himself.  It is not compelled speech when a recording of the song “Eye of 
the Tiger” is played in connection with Kim Davis’s release.  True, that may upset 
the band-members of Survivor, but characterizing that use as “compelled” speech 
is simply inaccurate.  No one is torturing or imprisoning the band to force them to 
play the song; they are not even physically present.  While playing a recording of 
the song may lead some to believe (mistakenly) that Survivor supports Kim Davis 
or her position, the First Amendment’s answer of more speech seems fully 
adequate to redress that concern. 
More importantly, for me, however, Drassinower’s principle misses entirely the 
point of copyright.  I have been the victim of copyright infringement.  When I 
submitted my Fair Use article to law reviews in the spring 2002 cycle, a student 
editor at a leading law review took the Word file that I submitted, changed the title 
of the article, substituted his name for mine as the author, and submitted it as his 
own work to various law reviews.  That fall, the article published first under his 
name in the SEATTLE LAW REVIEW and then came out a few months later 
under my name in the BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW.  When I 
discovered the infringement, the notion that he was forcing me to speak never 
crossed my mind.  Nor was my concern that he copied.  Rather, my concern was 
almost entirely the moral rights concerns of attribution and integrity.14  Another 
was claiming my work as his own, and he had published the initial draft, which I 
had revised substantially before publication. 
I recognize, of course, that copyright does not exist to serve my idiosyncratic 
preferences.  But I do not believe my experience in this regard is unique.  In all my 
years as a copyright attorney, no client has ever approached me and complained 
that another, by copying her work, is forcing her to speak.  Almost always, the 
client’s complaint is that someone has taken what belongs to them.  The closest I 
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have seen to the forced speech concern is when private (and usually embarrassing) 
letters, texts, or e-mails are published, but even there, the concern is more privacy 
than forced speech.     
I would be perfectly willing to put my personal feelings aside, however, if the 
principle Drassinower offered, despite its imperfect fit with my own experience, 
would prove more effective at reigning in copyright’s excesses on the key 
battlefronts of today.  Yet, it does not.  In my experience as a copyright lawyer, 
originality is seldom decisive; thus, it strikes me as an odd place to center 
copyright law.  Rather, the key battlefronts, as I see them, are the scope of fair use, 
whether the copyright term should be extended another twenty years, and the scope 
of secondary liability.  The instrumental approach has helpful, and in my view, 
very persuasive arguments to offer on each of these issues.  It has already shown 
success in expanding fair use and in beating back attempts to expand secondary 
liability.  In these contexts, the instrumental approach focuses precisely on what 
we should care about – the great things, such as a searchable database of all books, 
and perhaps the Internet entirely, we risk losing if we interpret copyright over 
broadly.   
Drassinower employs his principle of forced speech to argue for similar outcomes 
on each of these issues.  Thus, on Google Books, he insists under his principle that 
Google is not speaking for itself; therefore Google’s copying should not count as 
actionable use under copyright.15  This interpretation is, by no means, self-evident 
from the principle itself.  But, even if it were, it omits entirely the reasons why we 
should care.  It substitutes an abstract principle for the real concerns at issue, and 
thus lacks entirely the emotional salience and resonance that is necessary to carry 
the day.     
As a scholar, my life’s work has been devoted, in large part, to correcting errors 
and pointing out common fallacies in the instrumental case for broader copyright, 
and to showing that the proper application of instrumental principles points to the 
need, today, for radically narrower and shorter copyright.  Drassinower’s book is a 
direct assault on my life’s work.  Perhaps it is not surprising then that I did not find 
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The purpose of WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? is to set forth a rights-
based account of copyright law.  The book seeks to provide an alternative to the 
currently prevailing law and economics framework of copyright interpretation.  
The task is admittedly ambitious, perhaps even ill fated from the very outset.  The 
sheer dominance of the economic framework, certainly in North America, can 
hardly be overestimated.  It is so pervasive, so deeply constitutive of our 
copyright common sense, that the undertaking to raise questions about it cannot 
help but appear as irremediably foreign – reminiscent less of an aspiration to 
address others in a shared language, than of a timid archaeological impulse 
doomed to retrieve quaint traces of a superseded dialect.  Aspiring to provoke a 
transition from value to right as metaphors structuring copyright interpretation is 
akin to whispering in an emperor’s ear that the world-view her power has 
cemented is incoherent, if not altogether precarious.  One can count oneself as 
fortunate if the impertinence is met with ire rather than with incredulous 
indifference, silent contempt, or even plain bewilderment. 
 
Yet the burden of WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? is not quite as difficult 
as that of addressing an audience in the cadences of a language other than its own.  
It is true, of course, that the book’s alien or unusual intonations, at least in North 
America, require a level of abstraction sufficient to reformulate the very focus of 
theoretical attention, and thus both the way in which questions are posed and the 
parameters that define what an adequate answer looks like.  But the exercise does 
not proceed in a vacuum.  It is not as if the language of right approaches the 
language of value in the absence of at least the possibility of a common referent.  
On the contrary, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? operates on the 
uncontroversial assumption that copyright doctrine informs and structures 
copyright practice.  Whatever else it is or needs to be, a theory of copyright 
practice is inevitably a theory of central copyright doctrines.  To be sure, debate 
about what is truly fundamental to copyright practice is likely interminable.  But 
that truism need not distract us away from the unassailable observation that, to 
cite the most basic of examples, any conceivable theory of copyright practice 
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must provide a prima facie persuasive account of the doctrine of originality.  To 
be sure, we can and do debate whether a particular set of concepts can make sense 
of originality.  But we do not debate whether the doctrine of originality is among 
the dimensions of copyright practice that any copyright theory must elucidate. 
 
Glynn Lunney begins his irate review of WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? 
by objecting to my view that the law and economics approach cannot account for 
originality.  The economic approach construes copyright as a legal instrument 
designed to facilitate the production and dissemination of works of authorship 
conceived as instances of value.  Briefly put, my argument is that the economic 
approach cannot get copyright off the ground because originality, the threshold 
condition of copyright protection, affirms and must affirm a distinction between 
kinds of value.  Originality distinguishes copyrightable from uncopyrightable 
subject matter.  It grants copyright to some but not all instances of economic 
value.  It recognizes works of authorship but not facts, poems but not 
alphabetically arranged white-pages phone directories.  Originality is thus literally 
constituted as a distinction between kinds of value.  It therefore cannot be 
generated out of a theoretical focus on the production and circulation of value 
because its intelligibility presupposes categories other than value.  In short, no 
matter how sophisticated, a theory of value is just not a theory of authorship. 
 
Lunney concedes that a distinction between “authorship” and a “variety of non-
authorship creative products” cannot be made on the basis of value, but he adds 
that this “fact” is “simply irrelevant”.  He informs us that the law and economics 
framework makes the required distinction not on the basis of value but on the 
basis of “cost investment and recovery structure[s].”  But this move from value to 
markets by no means addresses the difficulty raised in WHAT’S WRONG WITH 
COPYING?  Just as there is nothing in the concept of value per se that permits a 
distinction between works and facts, so there is nothing in the concept of markets 
per se that permits that distinction.  The concept of market structure does nothing 
more than (re-)state the preoccupation with value: copyright law remains defined 
as a mode of remedying relevant market failure while minimizing cost or 
maximizing value.  Both works and facts, however, are public goods generating 
market failure requiring remedy.  Yet only works activate copyright.  The 
specificity of authorship vis-à-vis non-authorship products thus remains 
unresolved.  Lunney’s objection in fact confirms my viewpoint. 
 
Originality as a legal category is in fact indifferent to market structures.  On the 
one hand, it collapses economically diverse nonrivalrous and nonexcludable 
commodities into a single category of authorship.  That is, it does not distinguish 
between kinds of works on the basis of market analyses.  Cooking recipes, 
doctoral dissertations, Broadway plays, large iron sculptures of inter-galactic 
aliens and atonal jazz are indiscriminately protected.  On the other hand, as I just 
noted, originality distinguishes between works and facts at a literally foundational 
level, as a matter of copyright principle, and does so regardless and in the absence 
of market analyses.  The inappropriateness of the category of value as the linchpin 
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of copyright interpretation could hardly be more apparent: a market-driven 
approach would intimate distinctions (between kinds of works) where it 
shouldn’t, and would fail to distinguish (between facts and works) where it must.  
My point in WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? is not that there is anything 
particularly wrong with the economic approach as a mode of analyzing the 
efficient production and distribution of nonrivalrous and nonexcludable 
commodities.  It is rather that the focus on value (i.e. cost investment and cost 
recovery structures) is not a focus on copyright law.  The palpable distance 
between the market failure inquiry and the originality inquiry makes that 
observation abundantly clear.  The theory of market failure is just not a theory of 
authorship. 
 
Just as originality is indifferent to market structure, so is the analysis of market 
structure indifferent to legal doctrine.  Consider, for example, Lunney’s casual 
remark that “idea” and “expression” are “labels we attach upon instrumental 
balancing”.  Legal determinations are arrived at elsewhere.  Legal doctrine is not 
worthy of investigation in its own terms.  It has no terms of its own.  It is radically 
derivative, like an empty heteronomous shell responsive to “changes in the costs 
and economics of copying and distribution.”  The impoverished result is that 
market analysis has ears only for what it hears as “empirical” questions.  Thus, 
Lunney complains that I object to “empirical balancing of costs and benefits” on 
the grounds that it is (or can be) “indeterminate.”  He suggests that “better data 
and proper application of the burden of proof would seem the proper response, 
rather than abandonment of the economic approach altogether.”  Of course, this is 
a vast misunderstanding of my position.  My point is not that the economic 
approach does not have the answers but that, as a matter of foundations, it is 
asking the wrong questions.  No amount of data can provide a definition of a work 
of authorship.  No amount of data can render copyright intelligible.  The meaning 
of originality is not an empirical problem.  The economic analysis of copyright 
law regards itself as empirically evidenced, yet only once it has theoretically 
decided, as if by intuitive fiat, what counts as evidence.  The methodology I adopt 
in WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? is, by contrast, genuinely empirical: it 
seeks to observe, analyze and understand the fundamental co-ordinates, as 
expressed in copyright doctrine, informing copyright practice.  The legal 
empiricism of WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? is far more attuned with 
and respectful of its specifically juridical object than are the economics of public 
goods. 
 
Mark Rose’s classic AUTHORS AND OWNERS is among the copyright books 
that have most deeply influenced my thinking.  I cannot think of a single work 
from which I have learned as much as I have from AUTHORS AND OWNERS.  
I find in it an indispensable, canonical account of copyright from a historical point 
of view – an account widely accepted, even assumed, not only among those who 
share Rose’s deeply critical stance towards copyright law, but even among those 
who support it.  Rose is entirely correct when he observes that the copyright 
system he described in AUTHORS AND OWNERS is precisely what I set out to 
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“dismantle” in WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING?  There is a significant 
sense in which WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? is a response to 
AUTHORS AND OWNERS – a theorist’s insistence, one might say, to envision 
an alternative to the historian’s account of things as they are. 
 
In AUTHORS AND OWNERS, Rose renders Lord Mansfield’s judgment in 
Millar v Taylor as a foundational, paradigmatic moment in the construal of 
authors as owners, works of authorship as commodities subject to ownership.  
WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? provides an alternative exegesis.  It reads 
Mansfield’s judicial text as a pivotal moment not in the construction of authorship 
as proprietorship but rather in the emergence of authorship as a legal category 
necessarily distinct from proprietorship.  In my view, Mansfield’s is a specifically 
juridical reflection into the impossibility of grasping works as things, speech as 
subject to ownership.  Authors are speakers, not owners. 
 
Rose’s reaction to my representation of Mansfield’s judgment as antidote to the 
conflation of authorship and ownership is elegant.  Noting that WHAT’S 
WRONG WITH COPYING? is aimed at a philosophical construction of 
copyright law as a coherent juridical order, Rose writes that “At the same time, 
however, Drassinower reaches back into the period of copyright’s formation to 
find an historical anticipation of his theoretical account in the classic debate 
between Lord Mansfield and Sir Joseph Yates in Millar v Taylor in 1769.”  Rose 





My point is not that Drassinower is ‘wrong’ in his citation of 
Mansfield.  I don’t think he is.  In fact, I found his reading of 
Mansfield one of the most exciting and provocative moments in his 
book and I would not have him excise it.  But nor do I think the 
citation of Mansfield is really essential to his argument.  History 
and philosophy have different agendas.  History – a narrative of 
struggles, contentions, and ambiguities – provides, I think, too 
slippery a foundation for the erection of an elegant intellectual 
edifice such as Drassinower is constructing.  Drassinower’s 
enterprise is not to tell stories but to rationalize and formalize the 
residue of history, to reconstruct from its contradictions a coherent 
and more humane account of copyright. 
 
Even if my citation of Mansfield were wrong, in other words, the mistake would 
not threaten the integrity of my enterprise.  No one could mistake the generosity 
of Rose’s remarks.  Yet I hesitate.  I worry that this opposition between 
philosophy and history, coherent vision and slippery reality, erodes the aspirations 
of the theoretical imagination.  On the one hand, the philosophical stance Rose 
finds in WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? inoculates its project against the 
ambiguities of history.  Yet on the other, and at the same time, this very 
philosophical indifference to the rigors of historical truth appears to render its 
 The IP Law Book Review 31 
formalizing aspirations unpersuasive.  It is as if – though of course this is not the 
import of Rose’s comment – theory were somehow to be expected to bow to the 
sovereignty of history. 
 
One way to approach this fruitful dialogue between history and theory is to 
distinguish between the historian’s history and the lawyer’s precedent.  Both 
history and precedent take place in the past, of course, but a precedent is not an 
historical event, a moment in a narrative of struggles, contentions and 
ambiguities.  It is rather an aspect of a specifically juridical practice ordered as an 
aspiration to treat like case alike.  Legally speaking, the fact that Mansfield’s 
judgment took place in the past does not mean it is history, at least not in the 
sense of a fragment in an irreducibly incoherent narrative fraught with contention 
and contradiction.  As precedent, Mansfield’s judgment is, on the contrary, a 
foundational moment in an institutionalized practice constitutively seeking its 
own coherence.  Legal thinking does not develop independently of its past, 
seeking anticipation, confirmation or falsification only subsequently, in the 
sovereign archives of the historical record.  Rather, the history of law is always 
already the history of its thinking.  One might say that law is a craving to treat like 
case alike under the auspices of coherence.  In this vein, precedent is but a 
particularly dramatic illustration that, in law, the vicissitudes of history are 
irreducibly intertwined with the exigencies of theory.  In WHAT’S WRONG 
WITH COPYING?, Mansfield’s judgment appears, I hope, not as history but as 
precedent.  I would thus hesitate to characterize its citation of Mansfield either as 
unnecessary or as reaching back into history seeking anticipation of the copyright 
vision it unravels.   
 
To be sure, there can be no doubt that history and philosophy have different 
agendas.  But it does not follow that the past provides too slippery a foundation 
for the elaboration of juridical insight.  That, I think, would be too historical a 
way to portray the relation between thought and practice, history and theory.  In 
its own terms, legal thinking is a rendering of legal practice as a positing of its 
own coherence.  Legal thinking is what legal practice says of itself as an ongoing 
project to treat like cases alike – to do justice.  This is not to say that legal 
thinking requires slavish obedience to precedent.  But it is to recall that the very 
idea of precedent is unintelligible as anything other than a dimension of an 
existing practice insistent on its own coherence.  A precedent is not a piece of 
history.  It is a nodal point through which the present construes its past so as to 
formulate its future.  Precedent is an aspiration that legal practice shall have been 
coherent. 
 
I agree wholeheartedly with Rose that, certainly in the context of a discussion of 
Mansfield’s judgment in Millar v Taylor, the term “copy” carries dual meaning.  
On the one hand, it denotes a right.  On the other, it denotes a thing, a physical 
copy.  I think that my construal neither denies nor underplays this duplicity.  My 
point is rather to (re-)emphasize that it is the analysis of right that frames the 
specifically juridical meaning of the thing, and not the market value of the 
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physical copy that generates the rights attendant on it.  More specifically, the 
distinction between law and thing catalyzes the analysis of works of authorship as 
acts, not things, and thus pierces through the perceived conflation of copyright 
and property that Rose lays bare.  It goes without saying that this relation between 
law and thing is by no means devoid of ambiguity, tension, or deliberate and 
systematic contestation.  Rose is no doubt correct to note that it is impossible to 
say whether Mansfield’s 1769 judgment in Millar v Taylor truly presents a view 
of the “copy” as an act rather than a thing, a right rather than an instance of 
propertized value.  Rose suggests that it was Blackstone, “arguing [before none 
other than Lord Mansfield] in Tonson v Collins in 1762 and later developing his 
argument in the second volume of his COMMENTARIES in 1766, who fully 
transformed discourse into property” by allowing the notion of the “copy” to 
“acquire solidity and the aspect of a thing rather than an action.”  Yet 
Blackstone’s position in Tonson v Collins is itself rich with ambiguity, by no 
means a stranger to the construal of authors as speakers and of copyright as a right 
attendant on acts of speech.  “Consider writing, 1st,” Blackstone says in Tonson v 
Collins, 
as an assistant to the memory; 2dly, as a means of conveying 
sentiments to distant times and places.  In neither of these lights 
does the writer relinquish his title of making profit by his works; 
except that, when he has once written and published, he gives up 
the exclusive privilege of reciting to the ear; since, by parting with 
his manuscript, he has constituted a substitute in his stead, which 
speaks perpetually to the eyes of every reader.  But, though he has 
given out one or a hundred copies, has constituted one or a 
hundred substitutes to speak for him; yet no man has a right to 
multiply those copies, to make a thousand substitutes instead of 
one; especially if any gain is to arise from such multiplication.1 
 
While there can be no doubt that proprietary language pervades many aspects of 
Blackstone’s position in Tonson v Collins, as it also does, a few years later, 
Mansfield’s judgment in Millar v Taylor, the substantive right described in and 
through that language is not the exclusive right to the use of a thing but rather the 
exclusive right to perform an act in respect of one’s speech; in a word, the 
exclusive right to authorize another to speak on one’s behalf.  To “copy” is not to 
convert another’s chattel but to speak for another in the absence of her 
authorization.  Perhaps this is more implausible a reading of Blackstone’s position 
in Tonson v Collins than of Mansfield’s judgment in Millar v Taylor.  But 
however far it may have been developed in Blackstone’s COMMENTARIES, the 
peculiar project to transform discourse into property is not subject to completion.  
I believe Mansfield knew that.  He knew that any compelling response to Yates’ 
magnificent dissent in Millar v Taylor required a differentiation of authors from 
owners, communication from possession, and copyright from property. 
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Jessica Silbey’s comment focuses on the role of equality in WHAT’S WRONG 
WITH COPYING?  To begin with, she skillfully brings into relief the role of 
equality in the conception of the public domain I portray in WHAT’S WRONG 
WITH COPYING?  She then notes that, while it seems clear that equality is not 
the subject of WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? but rather its “assumed 
baseline,” it would have been helpful, nonetheless, for me to address it more 
explicitly.  Thus, I would like to set forth even if briefly how I conceived the role 
of equality in the book. 
 
The equality of authors as authors I develop is, in my mind, less an assumed 
baseline than a proposition derived from the analysis of copyright doctrine.  I do 
not go to copyright, so to speak, with equality in mind, asking copyright to live up 
my a priori assumptions.  It is rather that I find equality embedded in copyright.  
My analysis of the fundamental principle of independent creation presides over 
equality-driven readings of the doctrine of originality, of the defence of 
independent creation, of the idea/expression dichotomy, of certain paradigmatic 
aspects of fair use, and of the public domain.  The basic point is that, as a matter 
of copyright doctrine, an author’s right cannot be inconsistent with any other 
author’s entitlement to speak in her own words (even, of course, if those 
independently created words happen to be identical to those already uttered by 
another).  In short, authorship cannot assert itself as a subjugation of authorship.  
Speech cannot be a silencing tool.  Precisely as a speaker, the defendant neither is 
nor can be required to request the plaintiff’s permission to speak.  “Fair use,” as I 
put it at one point in WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING?, “literally drops out 
of the author’s mouth as she speaks.”2 
 
The equality embedded in the principle of independent creation thus defines and 
limits the author’s entitlement.  Authorship must be consistent with authorship.  
Following her very helpful précis of that argument, Silbey queries whether the 
concept of equal dignity is sufficient to ground the legitimacy of the defendant’s 
fair use of the plaintiff’s speech.  The point is well taken and worth developing.  
Equality per se is, after all, consistent with at least three possibilities as a principle 
structuring the relation between plaintiff and defendant in a copyright action.  
That is, each of  
 
(a) reciprocal forbearance from any unauthorized use of each other’s work (no 
copying is permitted); 
(b) reciprocal freedom to use without restriction each other’s work without 
authorization (all copying is permitted); and  
(c) reciprocal freedom to use without authorization each other’s work in one’s 
own (some copying is permitted); 
 
is equally consistent with the idea of equality per se.  We may say that (a) is 
plaintiff-centred, (b) is defendant-centred and (c) is, broadly speaking, a 
paradigmatic instance of what we call fair use.  Silbey’s point is that I need to say 
more than what I have said to persuade her that equality does the work I want it to 
do in WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING?  Of course, she herself points to the 
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answer when she notes that at stake is not equality per se but rather the equality of 
authors as authors notionally engaged in dialogue.  An author is someone who 
addresses another.  To address another is to presuppose the possibility of her 
response.  It is precisely this response by another that the idea/expression 
dichotomy and fair use contemplate and safeguard.  In other words, while (a) and 
(b) are compatible with equality per se, only (c) is compelling as a manifestation 
of a principle capturing fundamental features of copyright doctrine.  Whereas (a) 
posits a copyright devoid of limits, and (b) posits the absence of copyright, (c) 
captures copyright as a juridical structure ordering the relation of plaintiff and 
defendant as authors.  Descriptively, copyright is just not about either (a) or (b).  
The equality of authors as authors is thus less an assumed baseline than the result 
of an analytical elucidation of copyright doctrine.   
 
Still, Silbey is correct to point out that it would be both fruitful and helpful to 
elaborate the concept of equality further.  She ends her comment with the 
observation that, whether I would accept the characterization or not, WHAT IS 
WRONG WITH COPYING? is a book about human rights because it is a book 
about equality and dignity.  Silbey’s comment taps into themes that the book 
evokes but does not explicitly invoke.  Sufficiently explicit, I believe, are the 
book’s insistence to see copyright law in its own terms, as well the consequent 
deployment of copyright as an uncompromising affirmation of the public domain, 
and thus as a critique of the proprietary exaggerations in the name of which it is 
currently deployed.  Perhaps more deeply, or at least less explicitly, the book 
finds itself animated by a muted ambition to grasp the theory of copyright as a 
necessary, specifically juridical moment in a comprehensive theory of speech, and 
of the role speech in the constitution of the human self.  Of course, WHAT’S 
WRONG WITH COPYING? is, first and foremost, a legal book about copyright 
doctrine.  It starts and ends there.  But I cannot help but share what I take to be 
Silbey’s adrenaline in respect of the constellation of themes to which she alludes.  
I am deeply appreciative of her awareness that, precisely as a book about legal 
doctrine, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? is also a book about law as a 
depository of knowledge and insight. 
 
It goes without saying that I am grateful to Lunney, Rose and Silbey for their 
attentiveness to my book, and to Bill Gallagher for making this conversation 
possible.  I look forward to many future engagements on these shared concerns. 
 
ENDNOTES  
1 1 Black W 321, 324 [emphasis added].  This passage is quoted in Maurizio 
Borghi and Stavroula Karapapa, COPYRIGHT AND MASS DIGITIZATION 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 52. 
2 Id., p. 123. 
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